Strategic Unpredictability: Assessing the Doctrine from Nixon to Putin

Abstract

During the 2016 US presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump suggested the United States could benefit from a more unpredictable foreign policy. The assassination of Iranian Major-General Qasem Soleimani by US forces in 2020 during the Trump administration may be the best recent example of this doctrine in action. Other American presidents, including John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton, have applied it in different ways. Historical comparisons of its use in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the conflicts in Vietnam and Kosovo suggest that the expected liabilities of the strategy outweigh any likely gains. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be seeking to establish strategic unpredictability by threatening NATO with nuclear escalation should it interfere heavily in Russia’s war in Ukraine. This threat, however, has not deterred NATO from providing effective assistance to Ukraine. Policymakers should be deeply sceptical about the benefits of strategic unpredictability.