Abstract

In the intricate web of South Asia's security dynamics, India and Pakistan's relationship holds the key to equilibrium. Geographical proximity demands swift responses, prompting India's strategic shift towards Counterforce targeting. Official declarations and military posturing attest to India's resolute commitment to recalibrate its deterrence doctrine. This study critically examines the origins of India's Counterforce targeting strategy, drawing from existing literature and employing theoretical frameworks, including posture optimization, escalation ladder, superiority-brinkmanship, mathematical game theory, rational choice theory, and nuclear deterrence. These models collectively contribute to understanding the implications of India's pursuit of nuclear superiority for coercive diplomacy with Pakistan. Beyond enriching the understanding of South Asia's security, this research unravels the interplay between evolving nuclear strategies, the fluid dynamics of deterrence, and nuanced geopolitical ambitions. By deciphering India's counterforce targeting approach, this study fosters a nuanced discourse on South Asian strategic stability, offering insight into the pivotal role of nuclear deterrence in shaping the region. Bibliography Entry Ashraf, Mubeen and Syed Saif ul Haq. 2023. "Strategic Transformations: India's Pursuit of Counterforce Targeting and Regional Stability." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 14-26.

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