Abstract
Two influencers compete in two steps for the support of a politician: they use pre- and post- election offers. In equilibrium, the influencer with the largest endowment does not make pre-election offers and promises a prize for the winner of the election. The small influencer focuses on the pre-election stage and targets a single candidate. Regarding winning probabilities, this contest exacerbates the inequality of resources between influencers. The advantage of the large influencer increases with the number of candidates. Turning to spending regulations, pre-election spending limits favor the large influencer, while the opposite is true for post-election spending limits.
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