Strategic Thought on Southeast and South Asia

Abstract

Southeast and South Asia were secondary to Northeast Asia and even Central Asia through much of Chinese history. As relations with Russia and Japan took center stage in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this situation continued. In the 1980s strategic thinking centered on great power relations, even if economic openness raised the significance of Southeast Asia. Only from the 1990s does the gap narrow considerably, but maneuvering over the Korean peninsula and, as before, pursuit of Russia superseded any strategic priority to the south. At the same time, the rise of Southeast and South Asia in China’s strategic thinking was notable for at least four reasons: 1) intensification of great power rivalries, as Moscow was marginalized and Washington and Tokyo became drawn into these areas in new ways; 2) spillover from rapid Asian economic integration, in which China gained a prominent place; 3) the search for ASEAN-centered regionalism, fueled by uncertainty about leadership within Southeast Asia and a realization that giving new meaning to this entity would be important for stability; and 4) the growing salience of India and Pakistan as states that could command the attention of the great powers and influence the course of Asian reorganization. As these areas gained newfound importance, Chinese debates about international relations paid increasing attention to them.