Strategic Role of Trade Credit in Chain Coordination for the Traditional Farm Business Enterprises in Punjab, India

Abstract

Rice being a staple cereal, government purchases paddy (unhusked rice) from the primary wholesale markets in the surplus agrarian Punjab State and milled rice is distributed through the public distribution system in rice deficit States. Commission agents (CAs) in the primary wholesale markets that operate on a fixed commission basis constitute a strategic link between farmers and the procurement agencies/millers. To ensure adequate supplies of paddy for their own businesses CAs advance trade credit to the client farmers who need a regular flow of credit (during both the seasons annually that is not always possible to raise from the formal sources) for the purchase of operational inputs, on farm investments and various consumption purposes. So mutual interdependences, hereditary characters of the business enterprises and close proximities have enabled the chain partners to build up close personal relationships in the repeat business transactions. Farmers sell paddy through the preferred CAs during the post-harvest period, and personal relationships play a pivotal role in chain coordination while captive relationships ensure timely payments. For advancing trade credit, CAs' preferred choices are the medium and large sized farmers due to lower risks while the small sized farmers are less preferred because of their weak asset positions and payment uncertainties that increase the operational costs of trade credit. CAs make amicable adjustments to the utmost so that farmers do not shift away from their preferred CAs. CAs do not share any market risk, however, when paddy payments from the government to farmers get delayed they at their personal levels meet the requirements for cash contingencies of the client farmers. Knowledge gained from this study provides managerial and policy insights on the supply chain management mechanisms for the supplies of an essential input and its timely recoveries.