Abstract
This paper provides an empirical test of the theory of strategic regulatory entry deterrence – the theory that subgroups of firms within an industry will use the regulatory process to increase rival's costs and thereby deter rivals' entry. The results suggest that the commercial practice restrictions present in the ophthalmic industry deterred chain optical firms' entry into the market. This result in combination with earlier findings that the restrictions increase optometrists' prices suggests that cost-raising strategies can be used to disadvantage rivals or drive them out of the market without the need to lower price.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
