Abstract
Abstract This paper considers a retrial queueing system with a pay-for-priority option. A queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among the customers, the service provider (SP) and the social planner is developed. We obtain the equilibrium strategy of customers for any fixed priority premium and identify the unique Pareto-dominant strategy. The optimal pricing strategies for the SP and the social planner are derived and compared extensively. Interestingly, we find that the equilibrium outcome of customers is non-monotone in the service reward and the profit of the SP is bimodal in the priority premium. We reveal the fact that the SP’s optimization makes the system more congested than what is socially desirable. Finally, numerical examples indicate that the customer welfare can be improved by providing priorities when the market size is large.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
