Abstract
We introduce the conditional acceptance mechanism for solving the course allocation problem under priorities. This mechanism implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash equilibrium and undominated Nash equilibrium when preferences and priorities are substitutable. We model a post-allocation adjustment mechanism using a repeated version of the conditional acceptance mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by deviating from equilibrium. Both mechanisms are straightforward to implement, simplify the elicitation of students’ preferences, and share features with currently employed course allocation mechanisms.
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