Abstract
This paper analyzes a game of strategic trade policy between governments who may choose among quantity controls, subsidies, and non-intervention as policy instruments. Central to the analysis is our view of non-intervention as a distinct policy choice. We derive conditions under which non-intervention is strictly preferred to the alternative instruments. Preferences between non-intervention and the Nash equilibrium subsidy confirm to a simple distance measure involving the Stackelberg leadership subsidy; the subsidy level (zero or Nash) that is closest to the Stackelberg subsidy being preferred.
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