Abstract

This paper describes generation maintenance scheduling in an oligopolistic environment as a strategic decision. Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic electricity market have a strategic function, because GENCOs usually have impacts on market prices through capacity outages. The main contribution of this paper is modeling a game theoretic framework to analyze strategic behaviors of GENCOs. Each GENCO tries to maximize its payoff by strategically making decisions, taking into account its rival GENCOs' decisions. Some GENCOs own DG units, such as wind, diesel, biomass and fuel cell plants. Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used for decision making on maintenance problem in Oligopolistic electricity market. The Cournot-Nash problem is modeled as a mixed integer nonlinear programming optimization problem. The analytic framework presented in this paper enables joint assessment of maintenance and generation strategies.

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