Abstract
ABSTRACTDo interest groups and corporate lobbyists tend to support or oppose bills moving through Congress? Do they oppose legislation in early, malleable stages, such as in committees, or are they more likely to oppose legislation in later stages when majorities of lawmakers are pushing bills towards final votes? And can pressure form legislators force lobbyists to support bills inconsistent with their members’ interests? In this paper, I use data developed by the MapLight organisation on position taking by lobbyists lobbying the US Congress over ten years to find answers. Analysing a model built on theories of interest group influence, legislative behaviour, and the separation of powers, I find that lobbyists strategically choose their positions on bills for a variety of reasons, often prioritizing their need to please legislative allies over the need to faithfully represent interest group members or clients. The results raises serious concerns about representation by lobbyists.
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