Abstract
Abstract This paper examines whether banks strategically incorporate their competitors’ liquidity mismatch policies when determining their own and the impact of these collective decisions on financial stability. Using a novel identification strategy exploiting the presence of partially overlapping peer groups, I show that banks’ liquidity transformation activity is driven by that of their peers. These correlated decisions are concentrated on the asset side of riskier banks and are asymmetric, with mimicking occurring only when competitors take more risk. Accordingly, this strategic behavior increases banks’ default risk and overall systemic risk, highlighting the importance of regulating liquidity risk from a macroprudential perspective. ReceivedMay 4, 2016; editorial decision January 1, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan. Author has furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
