Abstract
An analysis of prospects for deriving self‐enforcing, global, greenhouse gas emission mitigation agreements is provided. Policy spillovers and carbon leakages are accounted for. Situations where mitigation effort should be concentrated in particular countries and where efficient outcomes can be fostered by international trade in emissions permits are discussed. The use of auxiliary policies to transform intractable Prisoner’s Dilemma incentive problems to more tractable problems, the role of policy commitments and the strategic implications of ‘no regret’ and ‘adaptation’ policies are analysed. Dynamic and repeated game formulations are outlined.
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