Abstract

Abstract : Throughout military history, certain battles are key turning points in any war. The 77-day siege of Khe Sanh, beginning on 21 January 1968, was one such battle and signaled the beginning of the end for the President, General Westmoreland, and the Vietnam War. The siege of Khe Sanh was one of many tactical battles fought during the 10-year Vietnam War. What makes this tactical battle different from others in January 1968 is the personal involvement by many at the highest levels of government to include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, cabinet members, senior advisers, the press, and ultimately the President of the United States. Their personal involvement at Khe Sanh led to a miscalculated over-emphasis in the strategic importance of Khe Sanh. Consequently, General Westmoreland focused his main effort at Khe Sanh and ultimately failed to identify the siege as a well orchestrated feint by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) for the ensuing TET Offensive. This research paper will examine the strategic implications of the siege of Khe Sanh. Specifically, this paper will examine how failures in strategic communications at Khe Sanh were the turning point for American involvement in the Vietnam War.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call