Strategic Generation With Conjectured Transmission Price Responses in a Mixed Transmission Pricing System—Part II: Application

Abstract

The conjectured supply function (CSF) model calculates an oligopolistic equilibrium among competing generating companies (GenCos), presuming that GenCos anticipate that rival firms will react to price increases by expanding their sales at an assumed rate. The CSF model is generalized here to include each generator's conjectures concerning how the price of transmission services (point-to-point service and constrained interfaces) will be affected by the amount of those services that the generator demands. This generalization reflects the market reality that large producers will anticipate that they can favorably affect transmission prices by their actions. The model simulates oligopolistic competition among generators while simultaneously representing a mixed transmission pricing system. This mixed system includes fixed transmission tariffs, congestion-based pricing of physical transmission constraints (represented as a linearized dc load flow), and auctions of interface capacity in a path-based pricing system. Pricing inefficiencies, such as export fees and no credit for counterflows, can be simulated. The model is formulated as a linear mixed complementarity problem, which enables very large market models to be solved. In the second paper of this two-paper series, the capabilities of the model are illustrated with an application to northwest Europe, where transmission pricing is based on such a me/spl acute/lange of approaches.