Strategic games on a hierarchical network model

Abstract

Among complex network models, the hierarchical network model is the one most close to such real networks as world trade web, metabolic network, WWW, actor network, and so on. It has not only the property of power-law degree distribution, but also the scaling clustering coefficient property which Barabasi-Albert (BA) model does not have. BA model is a model of network growth based on growth and preferential attachment, showing the scale-free degree distribution property. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation on a hierarchical network model, adopting the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and snowdrift game (SG) as metaphors of the interplay between connected nodes. BA model provides a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. But interestingly, we found that on hierarchical model, there is no sign of cooperation for PD game, while the frequency of cooperation decreases as the common benefit decreases for SG. By comparing the scaling clustering coefficient properties of the hierarchical network model with that of BA model, we found that the former amplifies the effect of hubs. Considering different performances of PD game and SG on complex network, we also found that common benefit leads to cooperation in the evolution. Thus our study may shed light on the emergence of cooperation in both natural and social environments.