Strategic forum selection and compliance in interstate dispute resolution

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic forum selection approaches and compliance with interstate dispute resolution settlements. Research shows that (a) management design features, like decision control and international organizations, affect compliance, (b) states strategically select among bilateral and third-party fora, and (c) anticipated settlement outcomes and enforcement inform pre-negotiation stages. A skeptical perspective suggests that states only select management approaches when they are confident in their ability to fully cooperate. Using Issue Correlates of War data, I test an endogenous model of forum selection and compliance. Statistical analysis finds that states strategically select management approaches in two cases: state-led mediation and ad hoc arbitration. Closer analysis suggests that, rather than tempering the promotion of mediation’s and arbitration’s pacifying benefits, conflict management scholarship should investigate more comparisons across dispute resolution approaches. This project’s multidimensional framework reveals that mediation and arbitration share similar foundations that logically link their selection and inclination toward compliance.