Strategic forces: Future requirements and options

Abstract

In the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the apparent ending of the Cold War, there have been renewed calls for radical cuts in US strategic forces to levels far below the 10,000 or so warheads allowed each side under the current START proposal. Since it now appears that NATO for the first time will have the capability to defeat a Soviet conventional attack without the necessity of threatening to resort to nuclear weapons, this should pave the way for the rethinking of US strategy and the reduction of US strategic weapons requirements. In this new environment, it seems plausible that, with a modification of the Flexible Response doctrine to forego attempts to disarm the Soviet Union, deterrence could be maintained with 1500 or so survivable strategic weapons. With a new strategy that confined US strategic weapons to the role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other countries, a survivable force of about 500 weapons would seem sufficient. With this premise, the implications for the US strategic force structure are examined for two cases: a treaty that allows each side 3000 warheads and one that allows each side 1000 warheads. In Part 1 of thismore » paper, the weapons requirements for deterrence are examined in light of recent changes in the geopolitical environment. In Part 2, it is assumed that the President and Congress have decided that deep cuts in strategic forces are acceptable. 128 refs., 12 figs., 12 tabs. (JF)« less