Strategic Ethnic Ambiguity

Abstract

Existing research illustrates how electoral incentives shape candidates' decisions to reduce ambiguity by cultivating ethnic identities. Extending this literature, I argue that electoral incentives may instead cause candidates to cultivate ambiguity around their ethnic identity. Drawing on existing theories of policy platform ambiguity, I argue that by cultivating an ambiguous ethnic identity, candidates increase their ability to attract voters across ethnic groups by reducing the aversion they would otherwise face from out-ethnic voters. Accordingly, I argue that candidates will cultivate ambiguous ethnic identities when electoral victory requires attracting voters across ethnic groups. I test these predictions in the context of Brazilian municipal elections where office-seeking Evangelical clergy face the decision to cultivate ambiguous or Evangelical identities via ballot names. I show that these candidates cultivate ambiguous identities when electoral victory requires attracting both Evangelical and non-Evangelical voters and Evangelical identities when victory can be achieved by narrowly targeting Evangelical voters.