Abstract
The tendency for countries to cheat on international environmental agreements has been well-documented. One reason is that less developed countries suffer technological disadvantages. While a number of authors have shown that technological transfers can solve the stability problem, real-world giveaways rarely occur. The purpose of this study is to investigate the conditions under which private licensing of pollution abatement technology, linked to cooperation on environmental policy, represents a feasible alternative. We find that, while a Pareto-improving solution exists, the licensing equilibrium is tenuous. Ironically, the more technologically advanced pollution abatement becomes, the less incentive there is for the recipient to cooperate.
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