Strategic Entry and the Relationship between Number of Independent and Non-Independent Candidates: A Study of Parliamentary Elections in India

Abstract

Elections in developing countries like India have sometimes attracted a large number of independent candidates. As this type of phenomenon is unheard of in developed countries, the article attempts to examine what kind of strategic settings can explain the emergence of such candidates. The article observes that a major factor behind the emergence of independents under first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral systems with weak regulatory checks could be the surreptitious strategic floating of such candidates by major political parties. Accordingly, the article hypothesizes a strong positive relationship between the number of non-independent and independent candidates in such democracies. The article also hypothesizes that the break-up of one or two-party dominance in these democracies and subsequent political churning may trigger such a relationship or strengthen it further. Empirical results for all parliamentary elections in India since 1962 reveal that during the first four elections in the reference period (e.g. during 1962–1977) when political fragmentation was low, the relationship was weak. However, subsequent political fragmentation in India during the 1980s gave birth to a new class of independents whose entries into elections were opportunistic in nature, leading to a strong relationship between the above two variables during this period.