Abstract

This study shows how an informed advisor can use selective information revelation to divert the agenda of a decision maker. An advisor is likely to employ diversion when the decision maker is restricted in the scope of her actions by time, resource, or institutional constraints. The incentive for diversion and the suspicion it engenders in the decision maker reduce the amount of information that can be conveyed by an advisor in two important ways: (1) by expanding the strategic conditions under which no information can be conveyed and (2) by reducing the strategic conditions under which complete information can be conveyed.

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