Strategic delinquency

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework of ‘strategic delinquency’. In so doing, it underscores how, whilst delinquent behaviour with respect to the global nuclear order and wider international order inflicts a range of costs, it can also procure beneficial social and material outcomes for the respective delinquent state. This framework highlights how states must consider the trade-offs of defying or complying with nuclear and broader international norms in deciding their behavioural choices. Before outlining this framework, this chapter outlines how the global nuclear order, and its evolving nature with time, remain inextricably intertwined with questions of international status. It emphasizes how, after its creation and consolidation in the post-war era, the global nuclear order and, specifically, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, have become increasingly fragile, not least owing to the nuclear aspirations of so-called ‘rogue’ nuclear states such as North Korea. As such, this chapter argues how engaging in strategic delinquency is one response by states that occupy a lower-status position within the global nuclear order in pursuit of beneficial outcomes.