Abstract
We review recent research into how firms navigate four complex decisions in corporate takeovers: ( a) deal initiation, ( b) pre-offer toehold acquisition, ( c) the initial (public) offer price, and ( d) the payment method. We focus the evidence on public targets and the theory on first-price or English (ascending-price) auctions with two competing bidders and a single (pivotal) seller. The evidence shows that nearly half of bids are initiated by the target (not a bidder). Notwithstanding the large offer premiums, only a small fraction of bidders acquire a target toehold prior to bidding. The first bid rarely attracts rival bidders, suggesting effective competition deterrence. Bid jumps are high, as predicted when bidding costs are large. Pre-bid stock price run-ups reflect rational market deal anticipation and are understood as such by the deal negotiators. Bidders select stock payment when concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal.
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