Strategic Coordination in the 2021 Russian Legislative Election: Effects and Counterbalances

Abstract

Abstract The study is devoted to strategic coordination represented as a list of “smart voting” candidates for single-member districts at the State Duma election on September 19, 2021. There is a great deal of skepticism in the literature that patterns of strategic voting can be found nationwide in Russia because of the prevalence of the personal vote in ticket splitting. The analysis of the election has confirmed that the effect of “smart voting” is rather small in contrast to the personal vote. Therefore, the attempt of the Russian non-systemic opposition to coordinate electorates strategically has not yet been an effective tool to mobilize voters on a country-wide scale. The study has also revealed strong counterbalances to “smart voting” like the incumbency advantage of United Russia’s nominees and the spoiler effect produced by candidates from the spoiler parties like the Communists of Russia and Party of Pensioners.