Abstract

Policymakers, officials, and commentators have long been concerned with the influence of global public opinion on U.S. foreign policy and national security (Farwell, 2012). The last 100 years have witnessed the establishment, consolidation, division, reform, or abolishment of numerous overt and covert agencies designed to influence foreign audiences (Arndt, 2005). Traditionally, the U.S. Department of State has led overt foreign influence activities, while the CIA has led covert operations, both of which reached their zenith during the Cold War (Simpson, 1996). In the post-September 11, 2001-era, prominent examples of U.S. strategic communication activities have included the Bush Administration’s “Shared Values” initiative in 2002 (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2006) and President Obama’s Executive Order 13584, which established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications in 2011 to counter terrorist propaganda within interactive digital environments (Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, 2013, para. 1). In order to align and synchronize foreign influence activities, in 2010 the White House issued the first National Framework for Strategic Communication, which defined strategic communication as:(a) the synchronization of our words and deeds and how they will be perceived by others, as well as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations professionals. (White House, 2010, p. 2)In addition to the White House, U.S. Department of State, and the CIA, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducts strategic communication, which it defines as government “efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power” (Paul, 2011a, p. 19). Over the last decade, the U.S. military has played a much larger role in strategic communication activities given the government’s interest in using communication as a weapon in the fight against terrorism (Nakamura & Weed, 2009). Despite U.S. efforts, worldwide terrorist attacks soared to a record high in 2012 (Burke, 2013) and the United States’ image remains weak in the Middle East and North Africa and volatile elsewhere in the world (Stokes, 2013). Specifically, in 2007, the BBC reported that in 18 nations polled, only 29% of respondents said the United States was a positive influence in the world (BBC, 2007). By 2010, that number had jumped to 46% (BBC, 2010). But by 2013, public opinion of the United States had plummeted, placing it just ahead of Iran as the world’s most unpopular country (Kierman, 2013). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently concluded that the DoD’s strategic communication programs were inadequately tracked, their impact was unclear, and the military did not know if it was “targeting the right foreign audiences” (Vanden Brook, 2013, para. 1). The U.S. military’s increased involvement in foreign influence activities thus raises critical questions concerning U.S. strategic communication’s premises, new and evolving forms, unintended consequences, and tangible results.

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