Abstract
In this paper we consider a two-stage game where at stage 1 the members of two groups of countries decide whether they should form a coalition and then at stage 2 determine their contribution to a global public good cooperatively within their respective group. After describing the Nash equilibria of public good provision at stage 2, which result either after unilateral or bilateral coalition building at stage 1, we provide some characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria of the entire game. Especially, we show that in many situations the coalition formation game at stage 1 will be of the chicken type, but that other game structures may emerge as well. Since partial cooperation by a smaller group of countries may undermine the willingness of a larger group to form a coalition some paradoxical effects can also be observed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
