STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS IN WOODROW WILSON'S NEUTRALITY POLICY, 1914–1917

Abstract

This article analyzes Woodrow Wilson's view of the First World War's implications for U.S. national security and the way in which he related the balance of power between the belligerents at different points in time to his diplomatic objectives. It approaches this topic, which is a subject of much debate among historians, by comparing Wilson's view of the war from late 1914 to early 1915 with that of his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, and by examining how those perceptions shaped the response of the two leaders to the sinking of theLusitania. Bryan and Wilson both wanted the United States to stay out of the war, both wanted the United States to mediate an end to it, and both of them saw mediation as a doorway to reforming international politics. Unlike Bryan, however, Wilson saw Germany as a potential threat to the United States and paid close attention to the balance of power between the Allies and Central Powers; he specifically believed that the Allies were likely to win the war. These views led Wilson to reject Bryan's advice to de-escalate theLusitaniacrisis and to adopt a much more confrontational policy toward Germany, one of the most consequential decisions Wilson made in the neutrality period.