Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

This article uses a rationalist approach to explain the international socialization of Central and Eastern Europe to liberal human rights and democracy norms. According to this approach, socialization consists in a process of reinforcement, and its effectiveness depends on the balance between the international and domestic costs and benefits of compliance over an extended period of time. EU and NATO accession conditionality has been a necessary condition of sustained compliance in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe that violated liberal norms initially. The pathways and long-term outcomes of international socialization, however, have varied with the constellations of major parties in the target states. Whereas conditionality has been effective with liberal and mixed party constellations, it has failed to produce compliance in antiliberal regimes. In the empirical part of the article, these propositions are substantiated with data on the development of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and case studies on Slovakia and Latvia.For useful comments on earlier versions, I thank the participants of the IDNET workshop seminars, especially Jeff Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Judith Kelley, Thomas Risse, and Marianne van de Steeg. In addition, the anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO made excellent suggestions for improving and clarifying the argument. The research for this article was supported by a grant of the German Research Foundation (DFG), 2000–2002.