Strategic behaviors of renewable energy generation companies participating in the electricity and carbon coupled markets based on non-cooperative game theory

Abstract

Renewable energy (RE) can participate in electricity and carbon market trading in China, which can help stimulate the investment of RE. Thus, we propose a bi-level model for non-cooperative game interactions among power generation companies (GenCos), considering the electricity and carbon coupled markets. The upper-level model considers strategic behaviors driven by maximizing profits for GenCos. The lower-level model includes a two-stage electricity market: the day-ahead market and the real-time market; it implements joint clearing of energy and reserves, and continuous trading with competitive auctions in the carbon market based on the clearing results of the electricity market. Simulations are performed based on the actual data of the power system in a certain region of Guangdong Province in China. The results show that electricity and carbon coupled markets can effectively reduce market costs and carbon emissions, improve the society welfare and RE benefits. The uncertain increase in RE output and higher installed capacity reduce the total revenue of the RE in the coupled markets. The initial carbon quota decomposition optimization decision of the coal-fired GenCos and gradual reduction in the initial carbon quota will increase the revenue of the RE GenCos.