Abstract

INTRODUCTION. The Subject and Objectives of the Research. Refinement of concepts. The State of the Art. The Research Outline. The Methodology. OLIGOPOLISTIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITH SYMMETRIC OBJECTIVES. Vertical Integration in a Successive Duopoly with Fixed Proportions of Inputs. A Basic Successive Duopoly Model. The Analytical Framework. Some Preliminary Results. Vertical Integration in a Cournot Successive Oligopoly. Horizontal Market Structure and Generic Vertical Industrial Structures. The Degree of Vertical Integration and Equilibria in Mixed Integration Games. Profit Incentives and Endogeneity of Vertical Industrial Structure. Vertical Integration in a Differentiated Duopoly. A Model of Successive Cournot Duopoly with Product Differentiation. Equilibrium Analysis. Product Differentiation and Equilibrium Vertical Structure. Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Variable Proportions of Intermediate Inputs. A Basic Framework. Equilibrium Analysis. Pre-Integration Vertical Structure and the Consequence of Vertical Integration. OLIGOPOLISTIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITH ASYMMETRIC OBJECTIVES. Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Asymmetric Objectives. A Model of Mixed Successive Oligopoly. Equilibrium Analysis. Major Findings. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. References. Index.

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