Abstract
Population aging poses challenges to the immature elderly care service system in many countries. The strategic behaviors of different participants in the provision of elderly care services in a long-term and dynamic situation have not been well studied. In this paper, an evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the strategic behaviors of two types of participants—the government sectors and the private sectors in provision of elderly care services. Firstly, eight scenarios are analyzed, and the evolutionary process and stable strategies are identified. Then, the behavioral strategies of the two types of participants under demand disturbance and dynamic subsidy strategy are analyzed. Simulation experiments are conducted to explore the influence of different initial conditions and parameter changes on the evolutionary process and results. The obtained observations are not only conducive to a systematic understanding of the long-term dynamic provision of elderly care services but also to the policymaking of the government.
Highlights
Xue et al [31] proposed a new private capital investment method and focused on the impacts of private capital investment on public transportation. They used an evolutionary game model as a quantitative analysis tool for administrators and the results showed that investment strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
We develop an evolutionary game model to analyze the behavior strategies of government sectors and private sectors in the provision process of elderly care services under different situations
We mainly focus on the behavioral decision-making process and results sectors’ supervision strategy, while the private sectors often respond to government policies, of the government sectors and privateMoreover, sectors ineach the type provision process of elderly care serservice cost and consumer demand
Summary
Data from the United Nations show that there are 702.9 million individuals aged over 65 worldwide in 2019, which is expected to increase to 1.55 billion by 2050 [1]. (2) In the long-term provision of elderly care services, the strategic choices of government sectors or private sectors have mutual influence on each other and they may not take the best strategy at the beginning of the decision process [18]. The abovementioned factors may lead to new changes in the elderly care service system, and affect the policies of the government sectors and the quality decisions of the private sectors. This research aims to study the decision-making process of government sectors and private sectors in the provision of elderly care services in a long-term and dynamic environment. (2) What effect will it have on the decisions of the government sectors and the private sectors if there are the following changes in the long-term provision process of elderly care services:. Some of the theoretical proofs and numerical simulations are listed in the Appendices A–D
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