Abstract
I present a model in which a nation must decide whether to reveal its military capacity when the nation faces two possible adversaries. One adversary would be inclined to attack if the country has a weak military capacity, and the other adversary would be inclined to attack preemptively if the country is developing a strong military capacity. I derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium for the nation to be ambiguous about its military capacity as a function of the hawkishness of the adversaries and the accuracy of the adversaries’ national intelligence.
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