Strategic active and reactive power scheduling of integrated community energy systems in day-ahead distribution electricity market

Abstract

The increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) enable integrated community energy systems (ICESs) as emerging techno-economic energy entities at the end-user side. In the deregulated electricity market, the ICESs can actively participate in the distribution electricity market (DEM) to provide active and reactive power dispatched by ICES operator (ICESO). In this context, a strategic active and reactive power scheduling model for ICESs in the day-ahead DEM is proposed in this paper. A novel trading mechanism designed for ICESO and distribution system operator (DSO)’s interaction toward both active and reactive power is represented in the day-ahead DEM, where distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs) for both active and reactive power are introduced as the market settlements. Then, the trading process is formulated as a bi-level programming problem. The upper level describes the combined cooling, heating, and power (CCHP)-dominated ICESO’s strategic active and reactive power dispatch, in which the DLMPs for active and reactive power, internal flexibility services, and optimal dispatch for inverter-based distributed generators are considered. The lower level performs a DEM clearing for both active and reactive power. Further, Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, Big-M approach, and duality theory are used to convert the bi-level model from a Mathematical Programing with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) model to a single-level mixed-integer second-order cone programming (MISOCP) model for efficient calculation. Finally, case studies on modified IEEE 33-node and IEEE 123-node distribution systems are adopted to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheduling method. The results show that the proposed scheduling approach can contribute to the renewable energy share and energy efficiency, reduce CCHP-dominated ICESs’ operation costs by 38.13% and 13.21% compared to the case where ICESO only acts as a price-taking consumer, and 6.64% and 3.44% compared to the case where ICESO does not consider reactive power bids/offers, respectively.