Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan

Abstract

ple’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most important challenges for U.S. foreign policy.1 Although many scholars judge current U.S.-China relations to be at their best in many years, President Chen Shui-bian’s moves toward gradual independence before Taiwan’s March 2004 presidential election, which were met by warnings and threats from the mainland, are a reminder that the Taiwan issue remains a potential source of instability.2 Further moves toward Taiwan’s independence during President Chen’s second term, such as rewriting the constitution, may very well lead to another Taiwan Strait crisis. The military buildup of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is largely focused on Taiwan, combined with the island’s disputed political status, make a PRC attack on Taiwan one of the most likely short-to-medium-term (next ave to ten years) threats to East Asian stability, and therefore U.S. economic and security interests.3 Could the PRC successfully use military force to settle the Taiwan issue? Scholarly debates about Chinese intentions and overall strategic goals in East Asia rarely address the prospects for a successful Chinese use of force Strangulation from the Sea?