Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we address the problematic of film narration and its narrator from a re-reading of Émile Benveniste’s theory of enunciation in open discussion with both the theories of film enunciation that have derived from it, and the cognitive theories that, by discarding it, have tried to take its place. This has led us to a differentiation between two dimensions of the problem of enunciation that are usually ignored: that which separates the act of enunciation and the subject who performs it from that of the textual subjects (the enunciator, the narrator …) who inscribe that act in the text. An erroneous understanding of the modes of enunciation of story and discourse has derived from their ignorance, which has led to reducing the former to a kind of form that derives from the latter, constituting no more than a form of discourse that would hide its basis. A precise enunciative definition of the lie is derived from their conscience. Certainly, there is always a subject of the act of enunciation whose traces can be recognized in the materiality of the statement. But there is a properly ontological distance that separates them – as material traces – from the enunciator, as a purely formal textual figure that, by being that, may or may not be present in the text. In this way, the Benveniste’s affirmation can be sustained according to which the story, the pure mode of the narrative, so to speak, is characterized by the absence – not the erasure, nor the invisibility – of any enunciator.

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