Abstract
This paper is the first to empirically examine the incidence, determinants, and consequences of the stop-loss early termination clauses (SLCs) in the hedge fund industry. The SLCs force hedge funds to be terminated when their cumulative losses breach certain thresholds. We find 14% of hedge funds in China have SLCs. Fund management companies with higher previous performance and risks are more likely to establish funds with SLCs. And funds with SLCs generate higher future performance. Further, funds become more risk-averse when they approach to the termination thresholds, especially for large funds. We attribute the better performance of funds with SLCs to prompt terminations of bad performing funds.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.