Abstract
This paper investigates whether more informative stock prices lead to managers making more efficient corporate decisions. I find a negative relationship between probability of informed trading (PIN) and firm value shortfalls, which capture managerial inefficiency. This relationship is robust to controlling for endogeneity issues and using alternative measures. Moreover, I show that stock price informativeness reduces managerial inefficiency by revealing new information to guide managers’ decisions and by enhancing corporate governance mechanisms that incentivize managers to make value-maximization decisions. This paper adds firm-level evidence to studies on the connection between stock market (informationally) efficiency and real economy efficiency.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
