Stock Pledge and Large Shareholders' Dual Timing Motivations

Abstract

Market timing is one of important factors in the decision-making and behavior of large shareholders, and stock pledge behavior provides us with a relatively transparent research perspective. This paper takes possible dual timing motivations in the decision-making of large shareholders as the research object and comes to the following conclusions:firstly, the desire and size of large shareholders' stock pledge are significantly and positively related to the stock mispricing, meaning that overvalued stock prices can drive large shareholders to pledge their stock holdings; secondly, compared with the credit squeezing period, large shareholders are more willing to pledge their stocks and the pledging size is also larger during the credit easing period; thirdly, stock mispricing and credit policy affect the desire and size of large shareholders' stock pledge simultaneously. It suggests that large shareholder's stock pledge exists dual timing motivations in stock and credit markets. This paper extends the literature of market timing and stock pledge, and is helpful to the deep understanding of large stockholders' motive for decision-making and influencing factors&economic consequences of large stockholders' stock pledge.