Abstract
Using the split-share structure reform in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine the effect of stock liquidity on investment efficiency. Consistent with feedback and incentive theories, investment efficiency increases after the reform but only for under-investing firms. Higher stock liquidity increases institutional ownership, board independence, and price efficiency, especially for under-investing firms; thereby increasing investment efficiency of firms including those owned by the state. Our analysis is robust to a battery of considerations, including multiple specifications and several natural experiments. Our findings highlight externalities linked to the Chinese reform and further substantiate the real effects of financial markets.
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