Stock co‐movement and governance bundles: Does the quality of national governance moderate this relationship?

Abstract

AbstractIn this study, we examine if corporate governance, as a bundle, can better explain stock co‐movement. To test the implication of governance bundles on stock co‐movement, we consider a monitoring and incentive alignment bundle. Using 2,659 firm‐year observations from 321 firms listed on the S&P 500 from 2009 to 2017, we find that the governance mechanism bundle can enhance the ability of stock prices to integrate better firm‐specific information, which reflects on stock co‐movement. In addition, we find the existence of a complementary relationship between National Governance Quality and a firm's board monitoring. This also helps in explaining the puzzle of stock co‐movement. The findings will extend the understanding about the co‐movement‐related literature mentioned in the corporate governance and corporate finance research. The findings are also helpful for decision makers and policy makers involved in the efficient controlling of stock co‐movement.