Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Strategy Selection of Green Building Stakeholders from the Perspective of Supply-Demand Subject Populations

Abstract

In construction industry, the research and development (R&D) and application of green building technologies (GBTs) are crucial to promote the development of green buildings. From the perspective of supply-demand subject populations, this paper discusses the dynamic evolution process of strategy between individuals within construction enterprise populations and between construction enterprise populations and consumer populations. Firstly, based on Moran process, the stochastic evolutionary game model of construction enterprises adopting independent innovation strategy was constructed to obtain the conditions for the dominance of independent innovation strategy. Next, the bimatrix game model of construction enterprise populations and consumer populations was constructed to obtain the equilibrium frequency of the joint strategy. Then, the influence laws of the change of parameters on game were discussed through numerical simulations. The results show that (1) reducing the cost of independent R&D cost, reducing the spillover effect coefficient, increasing the loss of technology introduction, and increasing R&D subsidies for independent innovation construction enterprises are all conducive to IIS becoming an evolutionary stable strategy. (2) The marginal effect of IIS increases with the decrease in the spillover effect coefficient, the increase in the loss of technology introduction of construction enterprises, and the increase R&D subsidies. (3) The smaller the mutation rate is, the greater the cross-price sensitivity coefficient is, the greater the green sensitivity coefficient is, the greater the probability of government active encouragement is, and the more dominant (production of green buildings, purchase of green buildings) is. Finally, relevant measures and suggestions are proposed.