Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations

Abstract

Continuous noise caused by mutation is widely present in evolutionary systems. Considering the noise effects and under the optional participation mechanism, a stochastic model for evolutionary public goods game in a finite size population is established. The evolutionary process of strategies in the population is described as a multidimensional ergodic and continuous time Markov process. The stochastic stable state of the system is analyzed by the limit distribution of the stochastic process. By numerical experiments, the influences of the fixed income coefficient for non-participants and the investment income coefficient of the public goods on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system are analyzed. Through the numerical calculation results, we found that the optional participation mechanism can change the evolutionary dynamics and the equilibrium of the public goods game, and there is a range of parameters which can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation. Further, we obtain the accurate quantitative relationship between the parameters and the probabilities for the system to choose different stable equilibriums, which can be used to realize the control of cooperation.