Stochastic dynamic pricing and advertising in isoelastic oligopoly models

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze stochastic dynamic pricing and advertising differential games in special oligopoly markets with constant price and advertising elasticity. We consider the sale of perishable as well as durable goods and include adoption effects in the demand. Based on a unique stochastic feedback Nash equilibrium, we derive closed-form solution formulas of the value functions and the optimal feedback policies of all competing firms. Efficient simulation techniques are used to evaluate optimally controlled sales processes over time. This way, the evolution of optimal controls as well as the firms’ profit distributions are analyzed. Moreover, we are able to compare feedback solutions of the stochastic model with its deterministic counterpart. We show that the market power of the competing firms is exactly the same as in the deterministic version of the model. Further, we discover two fundamental effects that determine the relation between both models. First, the volatility in demand results in a decline of expected profits compared to the deterministic model. Second, we find that saturation effects in demand have an opposite character. We show that the second effect can be strong enough to either exactly balance or even overcompensate the first one. As a result we are able to identify cases in which feedback solutions of the deterministic model provide useful approximations of solutions of the stochastic model.