Abstract
In this paper, we study TU-games with coalition structure and propose an approach for determining a stable coalition structure solving a stochastic game of a special form. Using a Nash equilibrium in this game, we draw an analogy between the stable coalition structure and an absorbing state in a Markov chain. In addition, we consider a case of restricted coalitions assuming that not all coalitions are feasible and extend the definition of the stable coalition structure to this case.
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