Abstract

ABSTRACT One of the main enabling reforms included in the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan is that of competition. In this regard, past pro-competitive attempts have usually disappointed expectations, above all due to the counter-mobilization of very powerful interest groups, able to act as veto-players in the policy process. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on the influence of Italian interest groups by focusing precisely on the pro-competition reforms in two highly politically salient policy sectors: unscheduled public transport services and beach concessions. Specifically, we want to make a triple comparison: between policy sectors, between subsequent stages of the policy cycle and between governments, focusing on the lobbying strategies deployed by the interests affected by the measures being considered. We interpret empirical findings on the basis of a detailed reconstruction of the policy processes, drawing on several interviews with privileged observers.

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