Still Staging Democracy

Abstract

Abstract: Georgia's August War with Russia prompted a new wave of political mobilization against the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili after a previous effort faltered in 2007-2008. Despite its renewed vigor, the postwar opposition failed for at least three reasons: 1) increased levels of political discontent did not translate to broad public support for the president's resignation; 2) the opposition remained divided with regard to its methods and aims; and 3) the government successfully represented itself as an alternative engine of democratization. Georgian politics ought to now be replaced by the implementation of desirable constitutional, electoral, and media reform. Keywords: August War, Georgia, Rose Revolution, state-led reform, street protest ********** Waging war, especially a disastrous one, can have dire consequences for ailing regimes. Georgia's August 2008 war with Russia came after a year of political discontent, especially in the capital city of Tbilisi; a slowing economy; and a rising disenchantment with the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili, whose ascent to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution was a hopeful sign of democratic breakthrough in the troubled Black Sea-Caspian region. Although the political opposition to Saakashvili failed to oust the government before the war, it regrouped afterwards, pursuing the president's resignation--a step it insisted was necessary for Georgia's further democratization and security. The defection of some previously high-level officials in Saakashvili's government, coupled with growing criticism of Saakashvili in the Western capitals most supportive of Georgia, encouraged the opposition to believe that its goal was both justifiable and obtainable. However, the Georgian government was not as vulnerable as many in the opposition believed. A post-Rose Revolution record of successful spending on social programs and infrastructure, the population's postwar solidarity in the face of the Russian threat, and foreign aid packages that included substantial budgetary support all provided the Saakashvili administration with a considerable cushion. More generally, the opposition simply underestimated the difficulty of translating social discontent into regime change. A disillusioned (or at least disconcerted) public still failed to view the war as the kind of unforgivable transgression the opposition made it out to be, so there was no sustained collective protest. The opposition's internal divisions also made it more difficult to compete with the state for support. Although the defections from the government may have been significant, there were only a few. By comparison, the opposition remained openly divided, with its leaders joining forces tactically but with no real consensus regarding the ends and means of protest, and often charting a course of action based on personal animosities toward Saakashvili or their personal political fortunes, rather than working to achieve political reforms. At the same time, the government dampened a new bout of revolutionary fervor by successfully establishing itself as part of the solution to the problems that the opposition diagnosed, rather than (as is usually the case in such circumstances) reinforcing the opposition's message through obstinacy and brute force. Government officials, from the president down, consistently acknowledged the system's democratic deficiencies and expressed a willingness to engage in a common effort to remedy them. Rather than retreat into authoritarianism, as might have been expected after a traumatic war, the government hewed to a process of political engagement that maintained its credentials as a democratizing, if not fully democratic, regime. That said, the government also demonstrated a facility for more customary methods of state control. Although the government initiated reform of Georgia's constitutional separation of powers, electoral code, and official and private local broadcast media, the government failed to move as quickly to reform the judiciary and the Interior Ministry--the key foundations of state power--or the ostensibly private nationwide broadcast television stations, which have the power to influence social attitudes particularly outside Tbilisi. …