Year-end Sale % OFF 
Abstract
While regulatory efforts have consistently attempted to limit a CEO’s power to generate self-serving outcomes, we argue that CEOs make use of particular aspects of their position – namely their control over information releases – to generate positive financial gains for themselves. Using the period following the options backdating scandal and the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley, we show that CEOs still receive stock options at suppressed strike prices, that they likely affect those strike prices by releasing negative news in the period before the option grant, and that these releases have a direct impact on the stock price of their firms. We discuss the implications and future research directions indicated by these findings.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
