Stevenson, David 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 583 be a welcome addition to reading for courses on Jewish history, nationalism and wartime ethnic conflicts, in conjunction with more nuanced studies. Humanities Department Alexander V. Prusin New Mexico Tech Stevenson, David. 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford, and New York, 2017. xxv + 480 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Table. List of principal personalities. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £30.00. This book is ‘saturated with agency’, to borrow Christopher Clark’s phrase from The Sleepwalkers. Like that account of the origins of the First World War, this history of international politics in the pivotal year of 1917 focuses on decision-making, the assumptions of political and military leaders, and the interactions between decisions within the shifting structures of power politics. Stevenson does not apologise for his elite perspective, though his detailed analysis in several chapters pays close attention to social conditions, morale in the ranks and the economic resources of the major powers. His is an argument for the importance of decision-making in understanding why the war lasted so long and why ‘apparently less perilous and less painful’ alternatives were not adopted. He shows that decisions almost invariably produced outcomes at odds with the intentions of political and military leaders. Many of them floundered in the complexity of the war, some remained hopelessly optimistic, and others acted because inaction (wrongly) seemed too risky. The book is divided into three different geographical sections — the North Atlantic, the continent and the rest of the world. Within each section, there are individual chapters on key decisions — from the German decision for unrestricted submarine warfare to the Balfour Declaration and the reconstruction of the Middle East. These chapters demonstrate Stevenson’s forensic skills in reconstructing the decision-making process, his sensitivity to the broader context for decisions, and his appreciation of the systemic character of international politics. About half of the book is devoted to decisions that shaped the continental war, including chapters on the February Revolution in Russia and the illfated Kerenskii offensive. For Stevenson, the February Revolution was the ‘second time-bomb’ under the duration of the war, the first being the German decision for submarine warfare and the subsequent entry of the United States into the war. The February Revolution revealed structural weaknesses in the Russian war economy, particularly in its railway network, designed for moving commodities along a north-south axis in peacetime, not an east-west axis for SEER, 96, 3, JULY 2018 584 wartime. Comparing Russia with Germany and France, Stevenson shows how the army was more vulnerable to revolution, due to the lack of trained reserves. In this context, political miscalculation exacerbated the strains of war. His deft pen portrait of Nicholas II as a family man, ill-equipped to manage the war effort meshes the personal with the political. After Nicholas II abdicated, the litany of ill-conceived decisions continued. Although Russia stayed in the war, a gulf opened between liberal and middle class elites and the peasantry and working classes over war aims. This gulf widened as a result of the Kerenskii offensiveinJuly1917.Stevensonshowshownarrowtheroomformanoeuvrewas, at least in the eyes of the leaders of the Provisional Government. Increasingly dependentontheAlliesforfinancialandothermaterialsupport,theProvisional Government considered the offensive a signal of commitment to the Allies and an opportunity to establish domestic order. Instead, the offensive petered out, the German army made sweeping gains, and regiments in Petrograd launched a short-lived insurrection. Although Lenin went into hiding following the July Days, Stevenson shows how the authority of the Provisional Government dwindled, setting the scene for the October Revolution. The final chapter of the book places that revolution in its international context, charting the fierce debates amongst the German political and military leaders as they sought to exploit the collapse of the Russian Empire in late 1917 and early 1918. This book presents an international system shaped by the great powers and the political and military leaders of those powers. There is little attention to states in eastern Europe and to important non-state networks and actors, who pressed claims to national self-determination. Nor do ideas play a central role in this study, in contrast to Peter Jackson’s recent argument about a normative revolution in international...