Stereotyped beliefs about desirability: implications for characterizing the child's theory of mind

Abstract

A central research issue in the child's theory of mind literature is the question of whether children appreciate the subjectivity of mental phenomena. The typical research paradigm involves researchers creating a discrepancy between children's own mental states and the mental state of a protagonist, and then asking children to predict the protagonist's reaction. A prediction that fits the child's own mental state (rather than the beliefs and desires of the protagonist) is seen as an indication that the child fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of mental phenomena. Here we present two experiments involving the use of desire statements in predicting other people's emotions which demonstrate that even when one does acknowledge the subjectivity of mental states, this does not necessarily leads to ‘correct’ predictions (e.g. predictions based on the protagonist's desires). Other factors, such as cultural knowledge, might influence this process. The first experiment demonstrates that even adults, with a fully operational theory of mind, sometimes choose to disregard information about other people's desires. Their own generalized beliefs about desirability appear to be instrumental in this respect. The second experiment, on sex-stereotyped preferences for toys, demonstrates that even young children already can use generalized beliefs about desirability as a basis for their predictions of others’ emotions, even when these beliefs on desirability do not coincide with their own desires. This strategy results in a response pattern that can be easily misconceived as an indication that the child does not yet appreciate the subjectivity of desires. Two remarks are made on the basis of these experiments. First, even a so-called ‘adult’ theory of mind tends to be affected by normative considerations and is therefore more complex than straightforward desire–belief reasoning. Second, whenever normative considerations come into play, researchers should be cautious that ‘correct’ answers in theory of mind testing may not always have been based on theory of mind reasoning, and that ‘incorrect’ answers do not necessarily imply the absence of an active theory of mind.